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This essay presents a critical analysis of patterns of research design decisions exhibited by authors of recently published 
empirical tests of media effects. The content of 211 articles published from 2010 to 2015 in six core communication journals 
was analyzed to document the design decisions made by the authors concerning their use of theory, sampling, measurement, 
and experiments. We also recorded the amount of variance explained by their tests and use this indicator of strength of 
findings to explain the patterns of methodological design decisions. The findings indicate that authors of these studies com-
monly select weaker design options over stronger ones. The reasons for these patterns are explored then critiqued leading 
to a series of recommendations calling for an evolution in thinking in the areas of method, theory, and paradigm. The 
methods recommendations attempt to increase (a) awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of options available for 
each design decision, (b) an understanding that often assumptions made to justify the selection of an option are faulty, and 
(c) a commitment to meeting a higher degree of challenges. The theory recommendations focus on increasing an understand-
ing about why designers of most tests of media effects ignore the many theories available when designing their studies. 
Morover, the paradigm recommendations focus on examining more critically the assumptions we make about the nature 
of human beings, the purpose of our research as challenges evolve, and the defaults in practices we have established in an 
exploratory phase.
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3I. General Criticism of the Development of the 
Field of Media Effects
It is vital for research fields to examine their patterns of 
methodological decisions periodically to assess whether 
those patterns are evolving along with the challenges. Such 
examinations are crucial in monitoring the development of 
the field (Borgman, 1989). 
The scholarly field of media effects is now almost a cen-
tury old and has produced a large number of empirical 
studies (see Bryant & Oliver, 2009; Nabi & Oliver, 2009; 
Perse, 2001; Sparks, 2015) that was estimated to have been 
over 6200 published studies a decade ago (Potter & Riddle, 
2007) and now is likely to be even larger. Scholars have 
periodically conducted content analyses of this growing 
literature to document various methodological features, 
such as the use of methods, theories, and types of samples 
(Kamhawi & Weaver, 2003; Lowry, 1979; Matthes, Mar-
quart, Naderer, Arendt, Schmuck, & Adam, 2015; Moffett 
& Dominick, 1987; Perloff, 1976; Potter, Cooper, & Du-
pagne, 1993; Schramm, 1957; Trumbo, 2004; Wimmer & 
Haynes, 1978). The findings of these content analyses have 
triggered many scholars to criticize particular patterns in 
the way researchers have been designing their empirical 
tests of media effects (Fishbein & Hornick, 2008; Kamhawi 
& Weaver, 2003; Krcmar, 2009; Lang, 2013a, b; LaRose, 
2010; Levine, 2013; Lowry, 1979; Matthes et al, 2015; Neu-
man, Davidson, Joo, Park, & Williams, 2008; Niederdeppe, 
2014; Oliver & Krakowiak, 2009; Perloff, 2013; Potter, 2009; 
Slater 2004; So, 1988; Valkenburg & Peter, 2013). 
This article begins with a review of the criticisms of many 
of these methodological patterns within media effects re-
search. We use these criticisms as a foundation to design a 
content analysis of recently published media effects studies 
in order to determine the extent to which particular meth-
odological patterns still exist. After reporting the results of 
that content analysis, I analyze those practices to uncover 
the assumptions that likely support methodological deci-
sions. Then I present a system of recommendations to help 
our fellow media effects scholars transition more efficiently 
into research practices that can better meet the challenges 
that we currently face in explaining what media effects are 
and how they arise.
II. Criticisms of the Design of Empirical Tests 
of Media Effects
Critics have repeatedly raised concerns about a variety 
of methodological practices in the communication literature 
in general and the media effects literature in particular. In 
this section, I focus attention on four areas that seem to have 
attracted the most criticism. These four areas are the use (or 
non-use) of theory, sampling procedures, measurement 
features, and the design of experiments.
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• The findings of published content analyses of the media effects literature are critically analyzed to provide a foundation 
for an analysis of current methodological patterns. 
• The design decisions made by authors of 211 articles reporting a test of media effects that were recently published (2010 
to 2015) in six core communication journals are analyzed. 
• The literature continues to display an atheoretical pattern evidenced by the majority of designers of media effects studies 
ignoring theories when constructing a foundation for their studies. 
• There is a continuing pattern of many authors of media effects studies selecting weaker options over stronger ones when 
designing their samples, measures, and experiments.
• A critical analysis of the likely reasons for these patterns of design decisions reveals that many of the selected design op-
tions are supported by assumptions that have been found to be faulty.




published in eight competitive peer-reviewed journals from 
1965 to 1989 and found that only 27.6% mentioned a theory. 
In an updating of the Potter, Cooper, and Dupagne study, 
Trumbo (2004) reported finding 42% of studies mentioned 
a theory. Bryant and Miron (2004) analyzed 1,806 articles 
dealing with mass media in three communication journals 
from 1956 to 2000 and found that 576 (31.9%) articles in-
cluded some kind of theory. Potter and Riddle (2007) ana-
lyzed 936 articles published in 16 journals from 1993 to 2005 
and found that 35.0% referred to a theory. From the findings 
across these five studies, it appears that only about one third 
of media effects research mentions a theory. 
Mentioning a theory, however, is not the same as using 
a theory as a foundation for the empirical study. When con-
tent analysis studies of the media effects literature have gone 
beyond recording mentions and analyzed how the mentioned 
theories were used, we find an even more troubling pattern. 
Potter, Cooper, and Dupagne (1993) found that only 8.1% of 
articles were guided by a theory and provided a test of that 
theory while another 19.5% were tests of hypotheses but these 
hypotheses were not derived from a theory. Trumbo (2004) 
in an updating of the Potter, et al (1993) content analysis 
reported finding that 18% of  studies published from 1990 to 
2000 were guided by a theory and that an additional 24% 
mentioned a theory but did not use it to create either an 
hypothesis or a research question to guide their studies. 
When Bryant and Miron (2004) analyzed articles published 
from 2000 to 2004 in six communication journals, they found 
that among all articles that mentioned a theory, only 23% 
used the theory they mentioned as a framework for their 
study. To summarize these patterns, it appears that about 
two thirds of published studies of media effects completely 
ignore theory and that within the one third of the literature 
that acknowledges at least one theory, the majority of ac-
knowledgements are simple mentions rather than using the 
theory as a framework for the empirical test of a media effect. 
The persistently low proportion of empirical tests of me-
dia effects that are guided by a theory is puzzling, espe-
cially when we realize that there is a large number of such 
theories available for testing. For example, Potter and Riddle 
(2007) found more than 150 theories in use in their analysis 
of published research from 1993 to 2005 in 16 journals. Bry-
ant and Miron (2004) found references to 604 different the-
ories, paradigms, and schools of thought in their analysis of 
1,806 mass media articles published in three communication 
journals from 1956 to 2000. 
A. Theory as Foundation 
Many scholars have argued that theory development and 
testing are essential to the overall development of the field 
of media effects (Kamhawi & Weaver, 2003; McQuail, 2005; 
Nabi & Oliver, 2009; Potter, 2009). For example, McQuail 
(2005) explained that because the  “main purpose of theory 
is to make sense of an observed reality and guide the collec-
tion and evaluation of evidence” (p. 5), the use of theory 
helps a field grow in a more useful and efficient manner. 
Furthermore,  Kamhawi and Weaver (2003) argued that 
“theoretical development is probably the main consideration 
in evaluating the disciplinary status of the field” and that 
over time, the need for theory-guided research becomes more 
critical because as “our field grows in scope and complexity, 
the pressure for theoretical integration increases” (p. 20). 
Theories can be a valuable tool in growing the knowledge 
in a scholarly field efficiently and effectively due to their 
ability to integrate research findings into a system of expla-
nation and to guide future research studies in a program-
matic manner. Good theories provide empirical researchers 
with a map showing the most useful paths for extending 
knowledge as well as showing the extent of progress along 
those paths. They also provide researchers with a progression 
of knowledge about the methods, measures, and analysis 
strategies that have been found to demonstrate the greatest 
value in contrast to other design options that have been re-
vealed to rely on faulty assumptions. Thus researchers who 
use a theory as a foundation for their empirical work increase 
their efficiency by following the theory’s guidance about 
what to test and how to test it in the best way possible. In 
addition, researchers who use a theory as a foundation for 
their empirical work also experience the benefit of using a 
richer context for presenting the findings of their individual 
studies. 
However, most of the empirical research in the field of 
communication in general and the sub-field of media effects 
in particular has been found to be atheoretical (Bryant & 
Miron, 2004; Kamhawi & Weaver, 2003; Potter, Cooper, & 
Dupagne, 1993; Shoemaker & Reese, 1990; So & Chan, 1991; 
Stevenson, 1992; Trumbo, 2004). For example, Kamhawi 
and Weaver (2003) found that only 30.5% of all articles pub-
lished between 1980 and 1999 in 10 communication journals 
even mentioned a theory. Moreover, within the sub-field of 
media effects, Potter, Cooper, and Dupagne (1993) conduct-
ed an analysis of articles reporting tests of media effects 
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they are doing as they perform those actions (e.g., typing, 
riding a bicycle, accessing internet sites). Because habitual 
behaviors are performed repetitively without much, if any, 
mental effort in a cognitive state of automaticity (Bargh, 
Chen & Burrows, 1996) and because people do not have 
counters in their brains that systematically record the ac-
cumulation of such behaviors, measures that ask respondents 
to recall how many times they performed these behaviors 
are fundamentally flawed (Slater, 2004; Verplanken et al., 
2005). When respondents are confronted with the task of 
providing estimates of a mundane behavior, they cannot use 
recall and instead must rely on heuristics (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984). Because there is a variety of heuristics -- in-
cluding anchoring, representativeness, availability, simula-
tion, and adjustment (Fiske & Taylor 1991) -- the data 
generated from such questions are likely to be a conglom-
eration of responses generated by different heuristics and 
thus result in a complex of confounds. For example, self-
report data of media exposure has been found to be composed 
of more than 20% measurement error in one early study 
(Bartels, 1993), and subsequent research has shown that this 
measurement error is likely to be much higher (Cohen & 
Lemish, 2003; Funch et al,. 1996; Kobayashi & Boase, 2012; 
Schüz & Johansen, 2007). 
When researchers compare self-reported data to elec-
tronically recorded data of mundane behaviors, they find 
little correspondence, leading them to conclude that self-
reported data has serious validity problems in many fields 
of study including psychology (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002), sociology (Lau-
ritsen, 1998), anthropology (Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfel, 
& Sailer, 1984), political science (Sigelman, 1982), criminol-
ogy (Hindelang, Hirschi, & Weis, 1981), and behavioral 
medicine (Stone & Shiffman, 2002). 
While the field of psychology has been demonstrating a 
movement away from the use of self reports of mundane 
behaviors (Haeffel & Howard, 2010), it appears that the same 
cannot be said about the field of communication. Lowry 
(1979) analyzed 546 empirical articles published in seven 
communication journals from 1970 to 1976 and found that 
about three quarters relied on participant self reports. Levine 
(2013) in his analysis of the general communication literature 
of quantitative tests found that about 80% of all published 
studies used self reports and that this trend seemed to be 
growing; he found that 71% of the studies he analyzed from 
1988-1991 used self reports while 88% of studies published 
B. Sampling Procedures 
While there are many different methods used for generat-
ing samples for empirical studies, all of those methods can 
be organized into two types: representative samples and non-
representative samples. While representative samples are 
more difficult to construct than non-representative samples, 
they offer greater value to the development of the field of 
media effects because their findings can be generalized be-
yond the sample to known populations. Without representa-
tive samples, the field cannot build a base of knowledge about 
the scope, prevalence, and strength of media effects. 
Most of the media effects literature in the past has relied 
on non-representative samples. A content analysis of sam-
pling practices in media effects research found that 27.9% of 
media studies used probability samples and another 11.0% 
were population studies (Potter, Cooper, & Dupagne, 1993). 
A more recent study by Levine (2013) did not address the 
idea of representative samples directly in his content analy-
sis of the communication empirical literature but he did point 
out that 50% of the samples were composed of college stu-
dents, which indicates convenience sampling. He argues, 
“The use of expedient student data is somewhat controversial 
and is conventionally considered a limitation” (p. 78). There-
fore, it is important to examine the samples used in recent 
media effects research to determine the extent to which the 
literature is shifting away from the expedient option of select-
ing non-representative samples and toward the more useful 
-- but challenging -- option of generating representative 
samples.
C. Measurement Features
This section focuses attention on four measurement issues 
- the use of self reports of mundane behaviors, the use of at-
tribute variables as surrogates for active influences, the mea-
surement of change, and the providing of evidence for the 
quality of measures. 
Mundane behaviors. 
Media effects researchers frequently need to measure 
mundane behaviors, such as the extent of exposure to media 
and messages (LaRose, 2010). Mundane behaviors are ac-
tions people habitually perform in their everyday lives. Once 
learned, these behaviors are governed by a process of auto-
maticity where people no longer need to think about what 
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treatments are responsible for the differences in means across 
treatment groups. Such a claim implies change, that is, ex-
perimenters assume that the group of participants in each 
treatment condition are equivalent before experiencing their 
assigned treatments. So if non-equivalence is observed fol-
lowing the treatments (i.e., difference in means across treat-
ment groups), then this difference is assumed to represent 
change, but this is an assumption, not evidence of change. 
For example, let’s say that the treatment group displays a 
higher mean on the outcome variable compared to the mean 
of the control group. This difference could mean that the 
control group did not change while the treatment group did 
(increase on the outcome variable). Alternatively, perhaps 
both groups changed but the treatment group experienced a 
bit more change than the control group. Or perhaps the con-
trol group changed (scores were reduced for some reason) 
while the treatment group did not, so that the treatment group 
ended up with a higher mean on the outcome variable. With 
only one measure taken on the outcome variable, it is impos-
sible to tell which pattern occurred and hence where the 
change was. When researchers shift away from using as-
sumptions to support their findings and shift towards using 
more direct tests of their claims that generate valid evidence, 
the value of the findings from research studies increases. 
It appears that in media effects research, there has been 
a dominant practice of depending on assumptions about 
change rather than measuring actual change. In his content 
analysis of 546 empirical articles published in communica-
tion journals, Lowry (1979) found that 87% of studies relied 
on purely cross-sectional data. Levine (2013) criticized the 
general communication empirical literature for not treating 
communication as a process, but instead conducting cross- 
sectional studies that focus on differences and relationships 
at one point in time. 
Evidence for quality of measures. 
There is growing criticism about the lack of attention to 
the validity of measures used in media effects research, es-
pecially measures of media exposure (Fishbein & Hornick, 
2008; Gentile & Bushman, 2012; Niederdeppe, 2014; Slater 
2004). This criticism points out that researchers frequently 
describe their measures without providing a supporting argu-
ment for the validity of those measures, which  is a troubling 
oversight.
2008-2011 did. These findings led him to argue that “an 
over-reliance on self-report survey” items is “especially re-
sponsible for slowing intellectual progress” (p. 72). 
Attribute variables as surrogates. 
Although attribute variables (such as sex and age) are 
typically easy to measure, they are often imprecise surrogates 
for active variables (such as gender socialization and cogni-
tive development). When researchers intend to measure bio-
logical differences (such as hormones or body changes 
throughout adolescence), then biological sex is a valid mea-
sure, of course. However, often a measure of biological sex 
is used as a surrogate to represent an active influence, such 
as a pattern of gender socialization, and this substitution has 
been found to raise serious problems with validity. Also, a 
child’s chronological age has often been used as a surrogate 
for a child’s developmental maturity. However, research over 
the years has  shown that this is a poor surrogate for cognitive 
development (King, 1986) and moral development (Van der 
Voort, 1986). 
The use of attribute variables as surrogates for active 
influences generates a higher degree of measurement error 
than the use of more valid measures. For example, gender 
role socialization is a continuum of degrees of maleness and 
femaleness; collapsing everyone into two categories loses 
much of that richness of variation and runs the risk of mis-
classifying many people who are a blend of gender-related 
characteristics. 
Measuring change. 
Almost all media effects research assumes change, that 
is, media researchers perceive an effect as something that is 
altered in an individual (knowledge, attitude, belief, emotion, 
behavior) that can be attributed to some kind of media ex-
posure. However, measuring such change requires an assess-
ment of research participants at least two points in time. 
Typically one measure of the effect variable is taken before 
exposure to some media message and a second measure is 
taken after the exposure. When this minimum of two mea-
surement points is not met, researchers have no foundation 
for claiming whether or not a change occurred; instead 
change must be assumed.  
The assumption of change is widespread within media 
effects research. For example, experimenters will typically 
design studies that focus on group differences but then use 
those differences across group means to claim that their 
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tions still requires researchers to assume they have achieved 
equivalency. In order to test for equivalency, researchers 
conduct a balance check. Such a check is necessary to deter-
mine whether the assignment of participants to conditions 
has in fact resulted in a match of groups on the critical factors 
that are being tested as influencers of the outcome variable. 
Testing for group equivalency is especially important when 
researchers must use intact groups and cannot randomly 
assign participants to conditions; in this situation there is no 
basis for assuming equivalency, so a balance check is essen-
tial. 
Manipulation check. 
When experimenters do not conduct a manipulation 
check, they default to two assumptions, and one or both of 
these assumptions is likely to be faulty. One of these assump-
tions is that the research participants in each treatment group 
are accepting the meaning in the treatment that the experi-
menters intended. However, people are interpretive beings 
who are used to making their own judgments about the mean-
ing of media messages (Barthes, 1967; Fiske, 1987; Krcmar, 
2009).  People have been shown to exhibit a range of inter-
pretations about whether a message is entertaining (Bartsch, 
2012), humorous (Boxman-Shabtai & Shifman, 2014), and 
whether characters are good or bad (Krakowiac & Oliver, 
2012). Therefore, the default should be skepticism about what 
meaning is being received by participants, and until research-
ers can demonstrate that participants in a treatment group 
did in fact interpret the meaning in the way that researchers 
intended, it is typically faulty to assume that they did.
The second assumption experimenters often make is that 
if there is variation among interpretations across participants 
in the same treatment group, then that variation is unimport-
ant. This assumption is built into the ANOVA statistical 
procedure where within-group variation is regarded as error 
that is used as the denominator in computing an F ratio with 
the numerator being the between treatment group variation. 
Thus ignoring the differences across individuals in their 
interpretations of any media message creates an artificially 
low ceiling on the amount of variance that can be explained 
(Oliver & Krakowiak, 2009; Valkenburg & Peter, 2013). Con-
ducting a manipulation check gives researchers the ability 
to determine whether their participants received the same 
message and therefore the same stimulus. Because if there is 
a large variation within a treatment group on the interpreta-
tion of meaning, then researchers must realize that while 
D. Design of Experiments 
The experiment is a useful method that allows media 
effects researchers to focus on a particular factor of influence 
then test whether that factor makes a difference in bringing 
about a media effect. The experiment has been a popular 
method in testing for possible media effects, although not as 
popular as the survey. In his analysis of empirical articles 
published from 1970 through 1976 in seven journals, Lowry 
(1979) found that 30% used survey, 19% used experiments, 
and 13% used content analysis. In their analysis of articles 
published from 1980 to 1999 in 10 communication journals, 
Kamhawi and Weaver (2003) found that 33.3% used survey 
method; 30.0% used content analysis; 13.3% were experi-
ments; 4.7% used historical method; 10.3% used other qual-
itative methods; and the remaining 8.4% used a combination 
of methods. Potter and Riddle (2007) found that survey 
method accounted for 32.0% of their analyzed studies, ex-
periments for 28.8% (with 261 out of 277 being laboratory-
based experiments), qualitative methods for 15.4, secondary 
analysis of an existing database for 8.4% and content analy-
sis for 2.5%.
In order for an experiment to generate results that are 
useful, designers of experiments need to demonstrate (1) that 
their treatment groups are equivalent and (2) that the treat-
ments delivered to each group have conveyed the meaning 
that researchers expected those treatments to deliver. As for 
the first task, researchers typically use random assignment 
and checking their experimental groupings for balance. As 
for the second task, researchers conduct manipulation checks. 
Random assignment. 
The primary advantage of using random assignment is 
that it “protects significance testing: Without random assign-
ment, a test of statistical significance of between-group dif-
ferences is not conventionally interpretable” (Krause & 
Howard, 2003, p. 753) because “random assignment protects 
statistical significance by preserving the applicability of the 
logical model upon which significance testing is based. Treat-
ment and control groups being compared for significance 
testing are assumed by the model to be alike in dependent 
variable expected values with respect to everything but pos-
sible differences due to treatment effects” (p. 761). 
Balance check. 
Random assignment of individuals to treatment condi-
W. James Potter
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the focus instead on the proportion of variation the study is 
able to explain.  Gigerenzer and Marewski (2015) criticized 
the use of statistical significance saying that it has become a 
surrogate for good research. They say it is practiced in a 
compulsive, mechanical way — without judging whether it 
makes sense or not. Abelson (1985) argued that in his field 
of psychology, researchers “sometimes tend to rely too much 
on statistical significance tests as the basis for making sub-
stantive claims, thereby often disguising low levels of vari-
ance explanation” (p. 129). 
Researchers know that they can always achieve statistical 
significance by continuing to increase the size of their sam-
ples. Thus using statistical significance as a threshold for 
determining the value of findings is a weak criterion, espe-
cially when we consider the work of Meehl (1990) who found 
that almost all constructs of interest to social scientists (at-
titudes, stereotypes, beliefs, impressions, and expectations) 
were weakly related to one another. He referred to this wide-
spread pattern of low-level association throughout the social 
sciences as “the crud factor” to warn social scientists that it 
is specious to present their findings as important when they 
find only weak correlations, whether they are statistically 
significant or not. Schneider (2007) further developed this 
point by arguing that “the challenge for social scientists re-
sides in their ability to conduct studies that will go beyond 
identifying which variables are related (as this is likely to be 
almost all of them)” and instead to determine “which vari-
ables are the most strongly related . . . in theoretically or 
practically important ways” (p. 182).
We know from meta-analyses of various topics within 
the media effects literature that the effect sizes found in em-
pirical research studies are modest (Valkenburg & Peter, 
2013). Effect sizes typically fall in the range of only 2% to 
10% of variance explained for even the most highly re-
searched topics such as violence, sex, and advertising (see 
reviews in Preiss, Gayle, Burrell, Allen, & Bryant, 2007). 
While these meta-analyses of parts of the media effects lit-
erature are valuable as indicators of how powerful various 
systems of explanation are, we lack a more general picture 
of the level of explanation across the entire field of mass 
media effects. But even more important is the need to move 
beyond an exploratory perspective on research where any 
findings are perceived to make a contribution as long as they 
are statistically significant and focus more on designing stud-
ies that can continually “move the needle” upward in the 
amount of variance explained. To do this, researchers need 
there was one stimulus administered to a particular treatment 
group, there was likely a range of stimuli received across 
participants within that group. To illustrate, we designed an 
experiment to test whether exposure to different levels of 
violence in a video resulted in a differential effect on an 
outcome variable (Potter, Pashupati, Pekurny, Hoffman, & 
Davis, 2002). With three treatment groups (exposure to a 
video with a low amount of violence, medium amount of 
violence, and high amount of violence). Our manipulation 
check revealed that the mean rating of violence in the stimu-
lus video was highest in our high group and lowest in our 
low group. But we also found considerable within-group 
variance such that there were many participants in our “low 
violence exposure group” who believed they saw a moderate 
amount of violence. Also, there were some participants in 
our “moderate violence group” who believed they saw a low 
amount of violence and some who believed they saw a high 
amount of violence. If our purpose was to determine wheth-
er the group means were different in the expected direction, 
we designed a successful study. However, if our purpose was 
to extend knowledge about how people process stimuli, make 
judgments about media stories, and how those judgments 
influence other types of outcomes, then our design and the 
simple comparison of means offered  limited value. 
E. Reporting Effect Sizes
The reporting of effect sizes is something that more schol-
arly journals are requiring of authors (Matthes et al., 2015; 
Sun & Fan, 2010). In their content analysis of experimental 
communication research published in four flagship journals 
from 1980 to 2103, Matthes and colleagues (2015) found that 
57.3% of experimental studies reported effect sizes. The find-
ing that more than 40% of studies did not report effect sizes 
led Matthes et al. (2015) to say, “this finding is still alarming” 
given that these articles were published “in the field’s flagship 
journals” (p. 202). In a similar study, Sun and Fan (2010) 
analyzed all articles published in four communication jour-
nals over four years (2003 - 2006) and found that the effects 
sizes were reported 79% of the time when the statistical tests 
were significant but only 55% of the time when statistical 
tests were non-significant. 
The increases in the proportion of the empirical literature 
that reports effect sizes is a positive trend because it serves 
to shift the focus away from using statistical significance as 
the main indicator of the importance of findings and placing 
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a more macro level (such as an institution, the public, society, 
the economy). Using these criteria, we identified a total of 
211 articles as providing tests of mass media effects.
Coding variables. 
The study measured 16 characteristics of each published 
article that was identified as dealing with media effects. Four 
of these were bookkeeping variables (journal, year, pages, 
and authors’ names), 10 variables focused on design features, 
and the remaining two variables measured whether authors 
reported the amount of variance explained and the extent of 
that variance. 
The 10 research design variables were developed from 
previous research studies then modified in a series of pilot 
tests in order to develop a list of options that reflected posi-
tions on a quality continuum for each of the 10 variables. 
Use of  theory. 
This variable had five values as follows: (a) a priori theo-
ry, where the authors used an existing theory to deduce hy-
potheses and test them; (b) theories are mentioned as a 
background rationale for the study but the authors did not 
use those theories to deduce hypotheses; (c) the authors de-
veloped their own speculative model and tested the elements 
in that model; (d) the authors presented and tested hypoth-
eses derived from their review of empirical findings but not 
from a theory; and (d) the authors did not mention any the-
ory as a foundation for their study. Because there is a range 
of definitions for what a theory is in the social science lit-
erature, we did not start with an a priori definition; instead, 
we let authors tell us whether they used a theory or not. If 
they referred to something as a theory, we counted it as a 
theory mention. Also, if they referred to something that is 
generally regarded as a theory (e.g., cultivation hypothesis, 
uses & gratifications) without using the word “theory,” we 
counted it as a theory mention.
Sampling. 
This variable had two values: Representative sample and 
non-representative sample. In order to be coded as a repre-
sentative sample, the authors needed to claim that their 
sample was randomly selected from a particular population 
or sampling frame. 
Measures. 
We collected data on five measurement characteristics 
to move variance from the denominator to the numerator 
when computing F ratios, that is, to reduce our tolerance for 
unexplained -- or error -- variance by thinking more exten-
sively about possible patterns of systematic variance. The 
progress of a scholarly field would seem to be attributable 
more to increases in explanation rather than how many 
analyses result in statistically significant findings. 
III. Current Patterns in Effects Research
In order to assess current patterns of methodological de-
cisions, we conducted a content analysis. This section de-
scribes the design of that content analysis then reports results. 
A. Generating Data to Document Recent 
Patterns
Sample. 
Riffe and Freitag (1997) characterized a field’s main-
stream journals as “the barometer of the substantive focus 
of scholarship and research methods most important to the 
discipline” (p. 873). Scholars who have looked at bibliograph-
ic citation patterns (Dominick, 1996; Reeves & Borgman, 
1983; Rice, Borgman, & Reeves, 1988; Rice et al, 1996; So, 
1988) have concluded that media research is largely clustered 
within a sub-set of four communication journals – 
Communication Research, Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic 
Media, Journal of Communication, and Journalism & Mass 
Communication Quarterly. Since those early bibliographic stud-
ies, two new journals have been found to publish a good deal 
of media effects research (Journal of Children and Media and 
Media Psychology) so these were added to our sample. For each 
of these six journals, we randomly selected two years from 
the period 2010 to 2015. Thus our sample was composed of 
12 journal/year units. We read through all issues throughout 
those 12 journal/year units and coded all articles that pre-
sented a test of a media effect. We did not code editorials, 
book reviews, introductions to symposia, or editors’ reports. 
We did include articles labeled as “Research in Brief” or 
similar designations.
In order to be coded for this study, an article’s authors 
needed to make some claim or provide some evidence that 
a medium exerted some kind of influence leading to a rec-
ognizable effect. Those effects could be on individuals or at 
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corded whether treatment groups were tested for balance 
(i.e., yes or no). Third, coders recorded whether authors re-
ported a manipulation check (i.e., yes or no).
Strength of  findings. 
Finally we recorded whether authors reported figures for 
proportion of variance explained in their statistical tests (yes, 
no). If such figures were reported, we recorded what those 
figures were. Typically authors who reported these figures 
did so for tests run on each of their hypotheses, and their 
reportings were usually R-squares for correlational tests and 
eta-squares for tests of differences. We did not manufacture 
our own figures (such as squaring simple correlation coef-
ficients) but confined ourselves to recording only indicators 
of proportion of variance explained as presented by the au-
thors. 
Testing reliability. 
Approximately 20% of the sample was coded by two cod-
ers to create an overlap that could be used to test reliability. 
First the unitizing was tested and it was found that there was 
agreement 99% of the time with the yes-no decision of wheth-
er to include the article in our study. Essentially , this is a 
decision about whether the article dealt with a media effect 
or not. Second, we computed the percentage of agreement 
between coders on each variable, then corrected these per-
centages of agreement for chance agreement using Scott’s pi 
taking into consideration all valid values and a “can’t tell” 
option on all variables. Scott’s pi figures are as follows: sam-
ple, .92; use of self reports of mundane behavior; .83; attri-
butes as surrogates, .81; presentation of validity information, 
.78; use of change scores, .90; use of theory, .79, and report-
ing of proportion of variance explained, .88. In addition, if 
the article was coded as an experiment, it was also coded for 
random assignment (.90), testing for balance (.84), and check-
ing for manipulation (.81). These reliability figures are rela-
tively high because almost all coding decisions were based 
on manifest indicators and few required judgments from 
latent content.
B. Findings
 Reporting the use of theory. 
Of the total of 211 articles analyzed, 59 (28.0%) were 
theory driven. That is, the authors referenced an existing 
– self-reported mundane behaviors, attribute variables, 
change scores, and arguments for quality of measures both 
reliability and validity.
As for self-reported mundane behaviors, we first exam-
ined whether researchers asked their respondents to self re-
port on their own behavior. Then we determined whether 
the behaviors were mundane, which were defined as habit-
ual behaviors performed in a state of automaticity. Examples 
of a question eliciting a self report of a mundane behavior 
are: How many hours of TV did you watch last week? How 
many tweets do you send each day? Examples of a question 
eliciting a self report of a non-mundane behavior are: Did 
you watch a movie in a commercial theater last week? Did 
you pay to subscribe to a new website in the last month?
As for attribute variables, we recorded the use of charac-
teristics of participants that were used as factors of influence 
on a media effect. These characteristics were typically the 
attributes of biological sex in place of gender socialization 
or the attribute of chronological age in place of level of de-
velopment (cognitive, emotional, etc.). 
As for change scores, we recorded whether researchers 
gathered data on their effect variable at more than one point 
in time. In experiments, we looked for evidence that authors 
administered a pre-test before a treatment followed by a post-
test. In surveys, we looked for evidence of authors adminis-
tering a questionnaire or interview at more than one point 
in time. 
As for making a case for the quality of measures, we 
looked for the reporting of indicators of reliability and valid-
ity for the measures used in the study. The coding of reli-
ability was based on whether researchers provided indicators 
of internal consistency for items on their scales (i.e., yes, no). 
As for validity, coders assigned one of four values to each 
article depending on how the authors treated the issue of 
validity: (a) argument for validity provided; (b) authors pre-
sented citations of other published studies using the same 
measures; (c) authors presented citations of published studies 
using measures that the authors adapted for their own use; 
and (d) authors did not address validity, that is, they simply 
described the measures they used. 
Experiments. 
If the study was an experiment, coders looked for three 
features. First, coders recorded whether the authors said that 
their research participants were randomly assigned to ex-
perimental conditions (i.e., yes or no). Second, coders re-
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as control variables . But these were not counted as surrogates 
unless the authors appeared to be using these variables as an 
indicator of something like level of cognitive development 
or gender role socialization. Third, only 26 (12.7%) measured 
the effect variable at more than one point in time.
As for making a case for the quality of measures, authors 
were found to be much more focused on reliability than 
validity. As for reliability, authors of 166 studies (78.7%) 
reported assembling individual measures into scales, and 141 
of these studies (85.1%) displayed tests of the reliability of 
their scales. Across these 141 studies that used scales, there 
were 559 scales reported and reliability coefficients ranged 
from .27 to .99 with a median of .83. 
As for making a case for the validity of any of their mea-
sures, 54.0% of authors ignored this task. Of the 97 studies 
that did offer some kind of support for the validity of at least 
one of their measures, 11.3% presented an argument for va-
lidity, 42.3% simply cited other published studies that used 
the measures the cited authors had used, and the remaining 
46.4% cited measures from other published studies that these 
authors then adapted for their own purposes. 
Design decisions in experiments. 
Of the total 211 articles coded, 95 (45.0%) reported ex-
periments, 108 (51.2%) reported surveys, and the remaining 
8 used a qualitative method. This shows a continuation of a 
trend reported by Matthes et al. (2015) where 43.4% of ar-
ticles in four mainstream communication journals from 2010 
to 2013 were experiments. 
Of the 95 articles that were experiments, 52 (54.7%) indi-
cated random assignment of their participants to treatments; 
26 (27.4%) reported they conducted a manipulation check of 
their treatments; and 13 (13.7%) said they conducted a bal-
ance check on the assignment of participants to treatments. 
Reporting variance explained. 
Of the 211 articles examined, 131 (62.1%) reported the 
proportion of variance explained of at least one of their sta-
tistical tests for a total of 681 reportings of a proportion of 
variance explained in a statistical test. The range of this 
distribution of proportions went from one proportion 
reported to 15 reported. The mean of this distribution is 5.3 
and the median is 5 reportings.
As for the strength of those figures of proportion of vari-
ance explained by each of those 681 tests, the range went 
from a low of zero (reported by 42 tests) to a high of 84% 
theory, deduced hypotheses from that theory, and conducted 
their study to test those hypotheses. About half of the coded 
articles mentioned at least one theory but did not use any of 
those theories to generate hypotheses; instead these studies 
either developed their own hypotheses (33.6%) and tested 
them or developed their own model (16.6%) and tested that 
new model. In the remaining 45 articles (21.3%), the authors 
mentioned no theory; these authors presented a study large-
ly driven by an exploratory type question. 
The findings of this current study show a continuing trend 
toward the greater use of theory as a foundation for a media 
effects study. The content analysis from 1965 to 1989 found 
8.1% of published tests of media effects was guided by a 
theory (Potter, Cooper, & Dupagne, 1993); the replication 
of this  content analysis found that 18% of published tests in 
1990 to 2000 were guided by a theory (Trumbo, 2004); and 
now this figure has increased to 28.0% in published tests 
from 2010 to 2015. 
Sampling decisions. 
Four out of five (80.6%) studies were found to use non-
representative samples. Thus it appears that the use of non-
representative samples is increasing when we compare our 
current results with those of Potter, Cooper, and Dupagne 
(1993) who found that 67.1% of empirical studies published 
in 8 major communication journals from 1965 to 1990 used 
non-representative samples. A likely reason for this trend is 
the increase in the proportion of experiments that almost 
never use probability samples. Within the group of surveys, 
one third used representative samples but with experiments, 
only 5.3% used representative samples.
Measurement decisions. 
Although there are no previous studies to use as bench-
marks of comparison with our results about measures, we 
can still see that there is room for improvement in three areas. 
First, 64.8% of coded articles measured mundane behaviors 
with self reports. Of these 136 studies, 65.4% used self reports 
of exposure habits to media, 10.3% used self reports of be-
havioral intentions, and the remaining 24.3% used self re-
ports of other mundane behaviors, typically estimations of 
habitual behaviors performed automatically in respondents’ 
everyday lives.
Second, 43.6% of the coded studies were found to use 
attribute variables as surrogates for active influences, typi-
cally age and sex. Of course, many studies used age and sex 
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another such that authors who use a theory as a foundation 
for their studies are more likely to select stronger design op-
tions which then lead to stronger findings as represented by 
explaining a higher proportion of variance. 
It is reasonable to expect a nexus among these three char-
acteristics. The use of theory as a foundation for empirical 
studies should be expected to guide study designers away 
from selecting options that previous tests of the theory have 
been found to be less useful and toward the use of methods, 
samples, and measures that have been found to be more use-
ful and valid. Because theories provide a structure for pro-
grammatic research, designers of theory-based studies should 
be more likely to focus on the most promising concepts and 
propositions thus increasing the explanatory value of each 
subsequent study, so theory-guided research studies should 
be expected to explain a greater proportion of variance in 
their findings. That is, when studies are constructed with 
stronger design options, those studies should generate find-
ings composed of smaller proportions of random error and 
therefore explain greater proportions of variance. 
We found patterns to suggest some support for this the-
ory-design-findings nexus. Table 1 displays an analysis of 
methodological patterns by the role of theory in the design 
of the published studies. When we compare the percentages 
of the middle two columns, we can see that authors who used 
a theory to deduce their hypotheses also selected better design 
options compared to those authors who did not use a theory. 
That is, authors who were guided by a theory were more 
likely to use a representative sample compared to those who 
did not use a theory (28.0% to 20.5%); were more likely to 
provide support for the validity of their measures (57.6% to 
39.3%); and were more likely to compute change scores 
(16.9% to 11.8%). Also, authors of theory-based studies were 
more likely to design experiments (49.2% to 41.9%), to ran-
domly assign participants to conditions (64.3% to 51.0%), 
and to conduct a manipulation check (28.6% to 24.5%). They 
were also more likely to avoid making design decisions based 
on faulty assumptions as reflected in being less likely to use 
attribute variables as surrogates for active influences (37.3% 
to 48.7%) and being less likely to use self reports of mundane 
behaviors (62.7% to 65.5%). While these comparisons indi-
cate a relatively consistent pattern of better design options 
compared to studies that did not use a theory as a foundation 
for their studies, the differences themselves are small and 
none are large enough to be statistically significant in our 
tests. Although it is likely that those differences might still 
(reported in one test). The median of this distribution was 
8% of variance explained, with one quarter of those reported 
tests explaining 3% or less of the variance. On the high end, 
one quarter of those tests reported more than 17% of the 
variance. 
IV. Big Picture Patterns
The reporting of the findings on the individual variables 
above shows some indications that patterns are shifting to-
ward using stronger design options, although there is still 
considerable use of weaker options. The terms “weaker” and 
“stronger” refer to the comparative ability of design options 
to generate knowledge about media effects that is even more 
useful. For example, when designing a sample, researchers 
have two options -- representative samples and non-repre-
sentative samples. Both types of samples are useful in gen-
erating data that can be used to describe patterns in the 
sample, but with a representative sample, researchers can 
also use inferential statistics to estimate the confidence lev-
el of their descriptions as reflecting patterns in the popula-
tions they represent. Thus representative samples are 
stronger than non-representative samples. Weaker design 
options themselves are not necessarily faulty because they 
still have value in generating knowledge about media effects, 
although researchers can use a design decision in a faulty 
manner, such as when they use a non-representative sampling 
procedure but then generalize their findings beyond their 
samples.
It is time to consider some explanations for why these 
patterns persist. In this section, we will first analyze the 
patterns of weaker design options in the context of theory 
use and strength of findings. Then we analyze the patterns 
of methodological decisions in order to determine the as-
sumptions that underlie the selection of the most prevalent-
ly used design options. 
A. Theory-Methods-Findings Nexus
The three main findings of this study are: (1) the major-
ity of published studies continue to avoid using a theory as 
a foundation, (2) there are patterns of design decisions that 
indicate the selection of weaker options over stronger ones, 
and (3) the proportion of variance explained by most studies 
is fairly small. Perhaps these three patterns are related to one 
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had a mean (.131) virtually the same as the group of 109 
studies that did not use a representative sample (.139). How-
ever, when interpreting this finding, we must also consider 
that almost 38% of the analyzed studies did not report any 
proportions of variance explained and that many of these 
were non-theoretical studies; if these authors had reported 
their proportions, perhaps the means of the non-theoretical 
group would have been much lower.
Thus the nexus argument appears to have some value. 
That is, scholars who use a theory as the foundation for 
designing their studies show pattern of being slightly more 
likely to select stronger design options over weaker ones. 
However, while these theory-foundation authors are more 
likely to report slightly greater proportions of variance ex-
plained, the mean of those proportions is lower than the 
mean of the distribution of proportions reported by non-
theory foundation authors. 
exist if we were to increase the power of our test to a point 
where those differences would become statistically signifi-
cant, we argue that statistical significance is a secondary 
concern to the more primary concern of consistency, which 
is an argument also emphasized by other scholars (Abelson, 
1985; Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015).
When we move on to the nexus’ third component -- pro-
portion of variance explained --  the expected inter-relation-
ships do not appear (see Table 2). It is puzzling to see that 
while authors of theory foundation studies are more likely 
to report figures indicating the proportion of variance that 
their tests explained (5.77 to 4.96), those median proportions 
were lower (9.8% to 14.5%) in studies using theory compared 
to those that did not. Also, when we analyze the differences 
in proportions of variance explained by individual design 
decisions, we see that the proportion of variance explained 
does not differ significantly on any of these design decisions. 
For example, the 21 studies that used a representative sample 
Table 1. Uniformity of Patterns Across Theory Usage




Sample Represent     19.4% 20.5% 28.0% 16.6% X2 = 0.07 df = 2 p = .701
Attribute Surrogate 43.6% 48.7% 37.3% 37.1% X2 = 2.80 df = 2 p = .247
Behavior Self Report 64.8% 65.5% 62.7% 65.7% X2 = 0.15 df = 2 p = .927
Validity Support 46.0% 39.3% 57.6% 48.6% X2 = 5.41 df = 2 p = .067
Change Scores 12.7% 11.8% 16.9%   8.6% X2 = 1.57 df = 2 p = .456
Experiment Method 45.0% 41.9% 49.2% 48.6% X2 = 4.14 df = 4 p = .387
Random Assignment 55.3% 51.0% 64.3% 52.9% X2 = 1.32 df = 2 p = .518
Balance Check 13.8% 14.3% 10.7% 17.6% X2 = 0.44 df = 2 p = .801
Manipulation Check 27.7% 24.5% 28.6% 35.3% X2 = 0.75 df = 2 p = .686
Variance Expl - Num 5.24 4.96 5.77 5.25 F  = 1.094 df = 2 p = .338




first category cannot be considered right or wrong by any 
objective standard because they are traceable to scholars’ 
beliefs about ontology and epistemology. However, the as-
sumptions in the other two categories do have standards that 
can be used in a relatively objective manner to determine 
whether they are faulty.
1. Assumptions attributable to research perspective. 
There are some research practices that will trigger a 
B. Analyzing Practices for Supporting 
Assumptions
We now shift away from testing for a nexus of patterns 
across the findings on our individual coding variables and 
attempt to dig deeper into the findings by examining assump-
tions in three areas: Assumptions traceable to foundational 
beliefs about research, assumptions that have been found to 
be faulty, and assumptions about the continuing value of 
exploratory research (see Table 3). The assumptions in the 
Table 2. Strength of Findings by Design Decisions
Mean S.D. n
Representative Sample: No .139 .144 109
Yes  .131 .130 21 F = .053 p = .818
Attributes as Surrogate: No .142 .150 67
Yes  .133 .133 61 F = .123 p = .726
Mundane Behavior Self Report: No .123 .108 47
Yes  .147 .158 81 F = .017 p = .358
Validity Argument: No .125 .120 62
Yes  .149 .149 66 F = .931 p = .336
Change Scores: No .130 .132 112
Yes  .189 .194 16 F = 2.420 p = .122
Exp - Random Assignment: No .145 .177 27
Yes  .115 .109 41 F = .749 p = .390
Exp - Balance Check: No .127 .142 60
Yes  .129 .127 8 F = .002 p = .965
Exp - Manipulation Check: No .134       .153 50
Yes  .110 .096 18 F = .372 p = .544
(back to text)
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Table 3. Analyzing Assumptions Underlying Selections of Methodological Options
Assumptions Attributable to Research Perspective
• 45.3% of experiments indicated no random assignment of their participants to treatments
Assumption: Participants are fungible
• 86.3% of experiments reported no balance check on the assignment of Ss to treatments
Assumption: Treatment groups are matched on key characteristics
• 72.6% of experiments reported no manipulation check of their treatments 
Assumption: All Ss within each treatment group perceive same stimulus
Assumption: All Ss within each treatment group perceive stimulus as intended
• 87.3% measured the effect variable at only one point in time
Assumption: In surveys, cross sectional data is adequate to suggest change. 
Assumption: In experiments, post exposure data is adequate to suggest change, even when those single 
point measures from individuals are averaged to form group means.
Faulty Assumptions
• 56.7% reported inferential statistics without providing a basis to warrant their use. 
Assumptions: Inferential statistics do not require the use of representative samples in surveys or 
random assignment of participants to treatment conditions in experiments. 
• 64.8% measured mundane behaviors with self reports 
Assumptions: Ss either provide accurate recall of details in their responses, or Ss are all using the same 
heuristic to construct their responses
• 43.6% reported using attribute variables as surrogates for active influences 
Assumption: Surface characteristics are valid indicators of active factors
• 54.0% made no attempt to establish a case for validity of measures




difference of opinion across scholars with some scholars 
believing that those practices exhibit the selection of adequate 
-- or even strong -- design options while other scholars believe 
that those same practices are not adequate. For example, let’s 
examine the design of experiments and focus on decisions 
about random assignment of participants to treatment groups, 
checking for balance, and checking the manipulation. With-
in the set of 95 experiments we examined, 54.7% reported 
randomly assigning participants to their treatment condi-
tions; 13.5% conducted a balance check; and 27.4% reported 
using a manipulation check. Taken together, these three 
practices can be regarded by some scholars as indicators of 
flawed designs. In contrast, other scholars might not be both-
ered by these practices and regard the techniques of random 
assignment, balance check, and manipulation check as not 
needed in order to design strong experiments. What could 
account for such a difference in judgment? The answer is 
likely to be scholars’ fundamental beliefs concerning ontol-
ogy (i.e., the nature of the phenomenon being studied) and 
epistemology (i.e., humans’ ability to generate knowledge 
about the phenomenon). To illustrate this difference in be-
liefs, I will present three perspectives on media effects re-
search that demonstrate how a legitimate difference in 
foundational beliefs can lead to justifying, or criticizing, 
design choices. 
Perspective One is characterized by a mechanistic type 
ontological belief where scholars regard humans as primar-
ily physical entities, much like any other physical entity such 
as ears of corn. For example, all ears of corn are the same in 
terms of needing the same nutrients, they all grow the same 
way and on the same schedule, and they all produce kernels 
that are the same. While there may be some ears of corn that 
have a few more kernels than other ears, that variation is 
trivial. Some scholars regard humans as primarily biological 
and chemical systems that all require the same nutrients, 
follow regular patterns of growth and maturity, have the 
same organ systems and chemical make-up, have a brain that 
is hard-wired to process information in a standard manner, 
etc. These scholars acknowledge that while humans may 
vary a bit in some characteristics, those variations are trivi-
al; therefore all humans are regarded as essentially fungible.
Experimenters who hold this set of Perspective One be-
liefs would perceive no need to randomly assign participants 
to treatment conditions nor to check for balance, because 
they believe that all humans are interchangeable. Research-
ers who believe that all humans are fungible would auto-
matically conclude that all groups would be equivalent 
regardless of how they were assembled. Therefore conducting 
a balance check or randomly assigning participants to treat-
ment groups are regarded as tasks that have costs without 
benefits. And once experimenters assume equivalent treat-
ment groups, the only explanation possible for a finding of 
differences in group means is that the participants in the 
control group did not change but that the participants in the 
treatment groups did change. Therefore there is no reason 
to measure participants’ values on the outcome variable be-
fore they experienced the treatment.
Perspective One researchers also perceive no need for 
manipulation checks because they believe that the charac-
teristics they build into the messages in their treatments will 
all be perceived uniformly by all participants due to the hard-
wired nature of human perceptions and the fairly standard 
ways humans attribute learned meaning to symbols. Fur-
thermore, these researchers believe that because they too are 
human and using the same perceptual and cognitive pro-
cesses as their participants, the characteristics they perceive 
in their designed treatments will trigger the same perceptions 
in their participants. 
Perspective Two is characterized by a belief that while 
humans are alike in many ways (e.g., as organic physical 
systems), humans are also different in other ways (e.g., inborn 
trait differences and broad scale socializing influences). How-
ever, these differences are less individual and more category-
based such that people differ across categories but within a 
category, they are very similar. Stage theories of human 
development are evidence of this thinking where all children 
at age 3, for example, are regarded as having the same cogni-
tive and emotional abilities explained by that stage of devel-
opment and that all 3 year olds are very different than all 6 
year olds because those older children all exist in a category 
of humans with a higher level of cognitive and emotional 
development. Because all humans within a category are be-
lieved to be similar, there is no need for random assignment, 
a balance check, or a manipulation check as long as all par-
ticipants are from the same category. This belief would also ex-
plain why so much of the media effects research focuses on 
categories such as demographics (sex, age cohort, SES, edu-
cational level, income level, etc.) and levels from stage theo-
ries. 
A third perspective is characterized by a belief that in 
some ways humans are all alike, in other ways humans dif-
fer by categories, and in other ways humans differ in impor-
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tant ways individually. These scholars search for evidence 
that humans are fungible for a certain kind of media effect 
and when they find it, they are comfortable assigning par-
ticipants to conditions without going to the trouble of random 
assignment and assume with confidence that there will be 
equivalency across groups. However, when researchers are 
dealing with characteristics of humans that exhibit a great 
deal of variation across individuals, study designers realize 
they can have little confidence in group equivalency unless 
they randomly assign participants to groups. Furthermore, 
these researchers are likely to be skeptical about their ability 
to generate equivalent groups even when using random assign-
ment. To illustrate, let’s take the example of how people react 
to violent messages in the media. Past research (for a review 
see Potter, 1999) has shown that people’s interpretation of 
the violence is influenced by dozens of factors about the 
message (degree of gore, degree of justification for the act, 
type of perpetrator, type of victim, portrayal of degree of 
harm, etc.), factors about the viewer (emotional maturity, 
socialization to aggress, history of bullying, moral training, 
range of intensity of physiological reactions, etc.), and factors 
about the exposure situation (peer pressures, authority de-
mands, etc.) These scholars also acknowledge that sets of 
these factors work together to exert their influence rather 
than acting alone and independently. Thus, even if we con-
sider only half a dozen of these facts and simplify each of 
these six factors to three values each, that would compute to 
729 factor combinations. Let us consider that we want to 
design a two group experiment (control and treatment) with 
30 participants each. The probability of finding one person’s 
configuration on these 729 factor combinations in the control 
group to be an exact match to a person in the treatment group 
would be very small, and the probability of matching all 30 
people in each group would be infinitesimal. Thus, while 
using random assignment would increase the probability of 
achieving matched groups, that increase would not be large 
enough to remove all skepticism about non-equivalency. Is 
this a hopeless situation? Not necessarily -- if we removed 
the need for equivalent groups. The way to do this would be 
to reconceptualize the value of experiments by focusing on 
two beliefs: (a) the belief that humans are individually dif-
ferent in their sensitivity to media effects because of their 
past experiences and reinforcement patterns, and (b) the 
belief that the process of influence with any effect involves 
multiple factors in complex interactions. Given this concep-
tualization of humans and the effects process, experimenters 
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would need to insure three design features: (a) a measurement 
of participants’ key characteristics in order to plot their sen-
sitivity to different effects (b) building in a recognition of the 
constellation of factors likely active in the process of influ-
ence with the particular effect being studied, and (c) a pre-
treatment as well as post-treatment measure of the outcome 
variable. Experimenters can still separate participants into 
treatment groups but they need not assume equivalency be-
cause the group is no longer the unit of comparison, so group 
equivalency is no longer important; instead, the unit of com-
parison is the individual. Researchers can still design dif-
ferential treatments to focus on a particular message element 
to see if varying that element across treatments contributes 
to an effect. However, they would not be limited to compar-
ing group means and would have many other more valuable 
options for examining how the featured message element 
interacted with other factors to explain the degree of effect, 
rather than simply reporting whether there was a group dif-
ference or not. 
Perspective Three requires higher costs in the design and 
execution of research studies. Designers need to be more 
careful in analyzing the findings in the published literature 
to identify larger sets of active factors in the process leading 
to the effect they are studying. They need to design a battery 
of measures to be able to plot their participants throughout 
a process of influence leading to the manifestation of the 
effect being studied. While all this additional design work 
requires higher costs to research designers, it also delivers a 
much higher payoff in the form of a much richer context for 
understanding the findings of any experiment. In this way 
designers could deliver much more conceptual leverage to 
the field. Even more importantly, this would move us away 
from a reliance on relatively simple designs based on faulty 
assumptions to study complex phenomena. 
If our purpose is to grow our knowledge about media 
effects, then we need to grow our research designs beyond 
the limitations that keep the ceiling on our understanding 
lower than it needs to be. Compared to a design that measures 
the effect variable only once, designs that measure the effect 
variable at multiple times are superior because they can 
document -- rather than assume – change. Moreover, they 
can plot the shape of that change over time to determine if 
the change is a short blip or a longer term alteration that can 
build in strength or decay over time. 
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research that displays this fault -- or any of the other short-
comings -- is worthless. Instead, there is potential value of-
fered by all authors who present clear descriptions of valid 
patterns they found in their samples. The problem lies in the 
practice of using inferential statistics when there is no basis 
for doing so and for then using those specious p-values as 
thresholds for claiming whether the descriptive statistics are 
significant or not. This practice has led some scholars (Abel-
son, 1985; Gigerenzer & Marewski,  2015) to criticize re-
searchers for their automatic, mechanical, and even 
compulsive use of inferential statistics without considering 
whether their use is warranted or not. 
We need to pay less attention to p-values, which have no 
meaning in most media effects research, and much more 
attention to the strength of findings. And we need to move 
past the simple grouping of statistical results into significant 
findings of non-significant findings solely on p-values and 
think more about the significance of findings in terms of 
their degree of meaningful contribution to our knowledge 
about media effects. 
Another widespread practice based on a faulty belief is 
the use of attribute variables as surrogates for active influ-
ences. Over time as the field has identified an increasing 
number of active influences in the media effects process, the 
marginal utility of using an attribute variable as a surrogate 
has diminished to a point where this practice no longer has 
value.
Perhaps the most puzzling practice is that in almost half 
of the published studies of media effects, the authors have 
made no attempt to convince readers of the validity of their 
measures. Scholars have a large literature showing a variety 
of measures on many variables. This literature demonstrates 
that with any given variable, there is likely to be a range of 
measures that vary in terms of how much error variance they 
generate, how strongly they are related to other constructs 
that they should be related to, and that the scaling of some 
measures are much more reliable than the scaling of other 
measures. There seems to be no justification for authors not 
showcasing a critical analysis of the relevant measurement 
literature to support their decision to use particular measures 
from other studies or to support their decision to design their 
own measures. 
3. Continuing value of exploratory research. 
What can account for the selection of the weaker options 
and the use of faulty assumptions to justify them? The reason 
2. Faulty assumptions. 
Four of the research practices we found seem to be trace-
able not to a legitimate difference in beliefs but to an accep-
tance of faulty assumptions. The first of these is the 
widespread use of inferential statistics regardless of whether 
they are warranted or not. Except for the few studies in our 
sample that used a qualitative methodology, all the studies 
used inferential statistics. However, only 19.4% relied on 
representative samples. When researchers conduct surveys 
with nonrepresentative samples, they typically demonstrate 
a belief that their use of inferential statistics can produce 
meaningful results, but this belief is faulty (e.g., Babbie, 1992; 
Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015). 
Although few experiments use representative samples, 
scholars have argued convincingly that inferential statistics 
can be used in experiments as long as participants are ran-
domly assigned to their treatment groups (Courtright, 1996; 
Kruglanski, 1975, Lang, 1996; Sparks, 2015). Lang (1996) 
points out that because experimental researchers are not 
trying to generalize their findings to larger populations but 
instead are focused on “attempting to determine if some 
variable (often called the treatment variable) is the cause of 
some effect” (p. 425), they can use inferential statistics to 
determine if the means on outcome variables across treat-
ment groups are large enough to be statistically significant 
as long as the participants were randomly assigned to those treatment 
groups. “The procedure of random assignment of subjects to 
treatment conditions not only results in equal groups but also 
forms the conceptual basis for the calculation of the theo-
retical distribution of all possible random assignments on 
which experimental inferential statistics are based” (p. 425). 
Given the requirement that researchers must randomly assign 
participants to treatment groups in order to establish a basis 
for using inferential statistics, it is a concern that we found 
that all the experiments we examined used inferential sta-
tistics although only 54.7% of those authors stated that they 
randomly assigned their participants to treatment groups. 
It is puzzling that so much of the use of inferential statis-
tics is unwarranted. Among experiments, we found that only 
52 out of 95 studies reported random assignment and that 
among surveys only 36 out of 108 studies used a representa-
tive sample, which means that only 88 out of 203 studies 
(43.3%) presented an adequate basis for the use of inferential 
statistics. Why are reviewers and editors of top scholarly 
journals so consistently willing to overlook this problem? 
The posing of this question, is not meant to imply that the 
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directly by designing the kinds of research studies that would 
be required to generate useful answers to them. To continue 
to evolve as a scholarly field, we need to shift our focus as 
we recognize how our challenge is evolving. 
V. Recommendations for Moving Forward
The findings of this study form the foundation for three 
sets of recommendations. First, we present a set of recom-
mendations addressing the need to evolve away from the 
continued use of design options that are based on faulty 
assumptions. However, these recommendations have little 
chance of being enacted unless we also evolve in our think-
ing about theory as well as critically examine our paradig-
matic beliefs.
A. Methods Recommendations
It is tempting to recommend that scholars move towards 
selecting stronger design options in place of weaker ones 
across the board. However, it would be foolhardy to expect 
a sudden revolution where each of these recommendations 
would be adopted and where methodological weaknesses 
would suddenly be eliminated. Instead, it is essential to rec-
ognize that the existing practices are entrenched, so it will 
take a gradual evolution for researchers to wean themselves 
from the habits that keep these practices continuing. Thus 
we present our methods recommendations in stages so that 
the patterns that appear to be easier to change can be altered 
first. Those changes that are likely to require relatively little 
effort to make while delivering relatively large increases in 
quality are labeled “higher leverage changes.” Other methods 
recommendations will require much more effort to change, 
and although these changes will also likely deliver a large 
difference in quality, they will encounter greater resistance. 
We label these “lower leverage changes.” 
Recommendations with higher change leverage. 
There appear to be four changes that can be made with 
relatively little effort in comparison to the increases in qual-
ity they will contribute to the research literature (see Table 4). 
First, we recommend that scholars continue the trend toward 
reporting the proportion of variance explained. There is 
almost no cost to doing so, because it is easy to request these 
proportions when running statistical packages. The benefits 
is not likely to be ignorance because social scientists are 
taught early in their training about basic requirements for 
sampling, measurement, and data analysis. For some design 
choices, cost may be an explanation. For example, it is much 
more costly to generate a representative sample than to use 
a convenience sample. Therefore, cost is a likely explanation 
for why the literature has so many more studies that use 
non-representative samples compared to the number that use 
representative samples. But cost does not also explain why 
survey researchers who use a non-representative sample then 
also use inferential statistics. Also, while greater costs may 
explain why designers cut corners, it does not explain why 
editors of scholarly journals as well as reviewers remain 
comfortable publishing studies designed with weaker options 
based on faulty assumptions. 
Perhaps there is a widespread belief that our literature 
only needs to be exploratory and does not need to grow be-
yond those limitations. This belief would explain why re-
searchers, editors, and reviewers are continually satisfied 
with the patterns of weaker design features because findings 
only need to be able to suggest what might be media effects and 
factors of influence rather than to be able to make more 
definitive statements about what is. A research literature that 
provides possible suggestions would not be concerned as 
much about patterns of weak design decisions compared to 
a literature that is more oriented toward building defensible 
elements of knowledge.  
When the field of media effects was new, exploratory 
research was the only option because the field had no body 
of knowledge to reveal that some assumptions were faulty. 
It had no history of design and measurement to inform re-
searchers about which practices were stronger or weaker. It 
had no clear picture of what a media effect was, how many 
there were, or the possible factors that might be influencing 
any effect. So any research study was able to contribute find-
ings of value about what might be a media effect or a factor 
of influence. Now that we have generated so much suggestive 
evidence for many different effects and many different pos-
sible factors of influence, the challenge has shifted to provid-
ing answers to the following kinds of questions: How many 
effects are there and how are they organized to work to-
gether? What are the most powerful effects? What are the 
most widespread effects? What are the effects that the great-
est number of people experience? What are the most power-
ful factors of influence from the media? Although these are 
extremely important questions, we have yet to focus on them 
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Table 4. Recommendations by Costs and Benefits
Recommendations Costs Benefits
Report proportion of variance 
explained
Low; statistical packages easily 
provide this
High; places focus on power of 
explanation instead of p-values
Present arguments for validity of 
measures
Low; large literature of measures 
already exists
High; reduces use of measures of low 
validity
Measure influences with active 
variables instead of attribute 
variables as surrogates
Moderate; measuring active variables 
is more challenging
High; greatly increases validity of 
data
Use electronic recording of 
mundane behaviors instead of self 
reporting
Was high but has been shrinking with 
newer technologies
High; greatly increases validity of 
data
Measure effect variable at more 
than one point in time to docu-
ment change
High; considerable challenge in 
avoiding threats to validity
High; provides much more direct 
measure of magnitude of effects
Increase usage of probability 
samples
High; difficult to generate acceptable 
response rate
High; essential for answering ques-
tions about prevalence, etc.
Increase use of theory as founda-
tion for studies
High; to break entrenched exploratory 
perspective
High; gain efficiencies in designing 
studies and integrating findings
In experiments:
Randomly assign Ss to treatment 
conditions 
Low unless dealing with intact groups High; provides requirement for using 
inferential statistics
Check for Ss balance across 
treatment groups on active vari-
ables
Moderate; requires more measurement High; documents validity of assuming 
equivalent groups
Conduct manipulation check to 
document what Ss perceive as 
stimulus
Moderate; requires more measurement High; documents validity of assuming 
uniformity of treatment
(back to text)
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will be substantial, especially if this practice helps to shift 
researchers’ basis for claiming the significance of their find-
ings away from using arbitrary thresholds of p-values and 
toward showing an increase in the proportion of variance 
explained compared to previous studies on the same topic. 
Moreover, a change in focus on significance is likely to lead 
to stronger research designs that would reduce the so-called 
error variance, which is likely to be generated by weaker 
design decisions. The most important indicator of the health 
of our field as a social science is the continual increase in 
our ability to explain the variance we generate in our em-
pirical studies. 
Second, we recommend that more designers of tests of 
media effects present arguments for the validity of their mea-
sures. There appears to be no justification for ignoring this 
task. The cost of completing this task is relatively low because 
there are many published studies on virtually every variable 
of interest to media effects scholars, and these studies can be 
easily identified through electronic searches. Furthermore, 
the advantages are substantial, because this practice would 
encourage designers to become more aware of the relative 
quality of existing measures when selecting measures.  Fur-
ther, it would discourage designers from adding to the pro-
liferation of measures when quality ones already exist. 
Third, we recommend continuing the trend of measuring 
influences on media effects with active variables and elimi-
nate the use of attribute variables as surrogates. The cost of 
making this change has been decreasing as the literature 
increases in size with a corresponding increase in informa-
tion about measures of active influences, especially with 
measures of gender role socialization (in place of biological 
sex) and human development in many areas (cognitive, emo-
tional, moral, etc.) in place of chronological age.
Fourth, we recommend that more experimenters ran-
domly assign their participants to conditions. With labora-
tory experiments, there is typically no cost to doing this, and 
the benefits are substantial. With field experiments that re-
quire the use of intact groups, we recommend that research-
ers use the groups instead of individuals as the units of 
analysis and randomly assign groups to conditions. This 
procedure may increase costs if new intact groups must be 
found in order to create a sample with enough units of anal-
ysis, but the increase in units will substantially increase the 
value of the research study’s findings. 
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Recommendations with lower change leverage. 
We present six additional recommendations for changes 
that will take more effort, so the leverage between costs and 
benefits is not as great as with the four recommendations in 
the previous section. However, each of these would deliver 
a substantial gain in quality of the research design.
Three of these recommendations encourage the use of 
additional measures over what are typically used. First, we 
recommend multiple measures of the media effect variable 
spaced out over different points in time so that change can 
be documented instead of assumed. Second, we recommend 
that designers of experiments include measures to check for 
balance on important participant characteristics. Third, we 
recommend that experimenters check their manipulations 
to insure that participants perceived the stimulus as the de-
signers intended. 
Building these additional measures into research designs 
increases the threat of reactivity of measures. However, using 
multiple measures should be viewed less as a barrier and 
more as a challenge, because there are ways to avoid those 
potential threats, although their costs are higher (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon, & Podsakoff, 2003). Campbell and 
Stanley (1963) have provided detailed suggestions to mini-
mize eight different threats to internal validity and four 
threats to external validity in the design of experiments. For 
example, when designers of experiments decide to measure 
the outcome variable not just after the treatment but also 
before the treatment so that they can document change, they 
run the risk of the pre-treatment measurement sensitizing 
participants to the treatment itself and this is a potential 
threat to the validity of their findings. However, if research-
ers construct a Solomon Four-Group Design, as Campbell 
and Stanley (1963) suggest, they can determine whether this 
potential threat actually appears, and if so, they have the 
means to remove its influence in the analysis of data. This 
design increases the cost because researchers would need to 
include four groups for each treatment in their experiment. 
Design choices force researchers to consider whether 
keeping costs low is more valuable than increasing the preci-
sion of their planned study and the potential validity of their 
results. Such a choice has implications beyond the design of 
any one study and has a cumulative impact on the overall 
field. Given what we know about the field’s modest ability 
to explain variance and its tolerance for weaker design deci-
sions, it would appear that our pressing challenge is to design 
studies that can explain a greater proportion of variance. 
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to meet researchers’ particular needs, those researchers now 
have the low-cost capability of texting participants at random 
times to ask them to report their specific behavior at that 
time. Researchers could ask people who agree to participate 
in studies to download keystroke recorders on laptops or to 
grant permission to collect data from the existing surveil-
lance software (such as built-in cameras) on phones and lap-
tops. There may be public resistance to allowing researchers 
to collect such data, however, given the public’s demonstrat-
ed acceptance of the willingness to pay the price of an inva-
sion of privacy as payment for the use of these devices, the 
population may have a much higher tolerance for others to 
observe and record their behaviors. 
Perhaps the most significant challenge in using electron-
ically recorded documentation of mundane behaviors is de-
signing ways of looking for meaningful patterns in those 
huge data bases. In order to engage this challenge, research-
ers will have to think more deeply about why they want to 
collect these data. Also, researchers will have to conceptual-
ize media exposure more precisely, for example, in deciding 
whether a click on a website counts as exposure, whether 
there are thresholds in time (does a one-second scan of a 
website news headline count as exposure), and when a se-
quence in web page surfing is meaningful. These are essen-
tial conceptual issues that have been finessed in the past, so 
confronting a challenge that requires more scholarly work 
would seem to be a positive development.
Sixth, we recommend that designers use theory as a foun-
dation for empirical tests of media effects. This recommenda-
tion is likely to require a relatively high cost from scholars 
who are unaware of the many theories available and therefore 
must sift through the hundreds of available media effects 
theories to find those of most relevant to their interests. How-
ever, once scholars make this investment, they then are able 
to achieve the efficiencies offered by the selected theory. 
Those efficiencies include guidance in deducing hypotheses 
from the theory’s propositions, selecting the best measures, 
using appropriate analyses of data, and contextualizing the 
findings. 
Even when atheoretical researchers engage in a line of 
programmatic research, which appears to be rare (Lowery 
& DeFleur, 1988) and can learn from their mistakes in design, 
they are still at a disadvantage compared to researchers who 
design their tests with a theoretical foundation. This is be-
cause non-theory driven empiricism provides no basis for 
falsification, as Karl Popper (1959) has pointed out. A test 
Valkenburg, Peter, and Walther (2016) remind us that because 
media effect sizes are typically so small, it is essential that 
researchers carefully consider all threats to validity and make 
design decisions that would minimize those threats as much 
as possible. When we let costs be the primary driver of design 
decisions, we will likely continue with patterns of weaker 
designs, and this will serve to institutionalize a lower ceiling 
on the validity, power, and usefulness of our findings. 
Our fourth lower leverage recommendation is to encour-
age designers to shift away from relying so heavily on non-
representative samples and be more willing to accept the 
challenge of generating representative samples. This chal-
lenge comes with the higher costs involved with constructing 
an adequate sampling frame of their population, randomly 
selecting units from that sampling frame, and insuring an 
adequate response rate. These can be very challenging tasks, 
especially insuring an adequate response rate. Until we can 
do a better job of meeting the challenges of designing studies 
that will allow for generalization and inferential statistics, 
we keep a narrow scope on the kinds of questions our re-
search studies can answer. 
Fifth, we recommend the substantial reduction and even-
tual elimination of the use of self reports as measures of 
mundane behaviors. Prior to the development of technologies 
that define the new media environment, there were few al-
ternatives to relying on self reports of mundane behaviors. 
The main alternative was using observers to follow people 
around in their everyday lives, and the cost for this was 
typically high. However, now with most people equipped 
with mobile devices they carry everywhere, there is a range 
of alternatives that vary in costs that are lower to substan-
tially lower than using observers. Mobile devices (smart-
phones, tablets, laptops) as well as products that people use 
everyday in mundane ways (cars, household products, etc.) 
consistently keep electronic records of the behaviors of peo-
ple who use them. Also, a wide variety of companies now 
routinely gather information about media use (Google, tele-
phone companies, cable TV provides, websites, etc.). 
The challenge no longer lies in designing ways to gather 
information on mundane behaviors but in (a) getting permis-
sion to use some of the massive amount of data that is already 
being generated every day and (b) analyzing those data. 
While it is costly to get access to some of these databases 
(such as from professional media usage monitoring firms 
like A. C. Nielsen), access to other databases is free (such as 
Google Analytics). And in situations were no database exists 
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The second area of questions focuses on the openness 
and integrative nature of theories. Do the theoreticians keep 
up with the growing literature -- both of direct tests of their 
theories as well as contiguous literatures -- in order to provide 
critical analyses rather than simple descriptive inventories 
of assorted findings? To what extent have media effects the-
ories altered their systems of explanation to respond to tests 
of falsification? That is, have theoreticians altered their ini-
tial propositions to make them less general and more con-
tingent? As research tests accumulate, theoreticians learn 
that their initial propositions might not apply to all people, 
in all situations, with all media content, so these propositions 
need to be scaled back from their general claims in order to 
eliminate those types of people, situations, and media mes-
sages that do not apply. Theories that do this well offer more 
guidance to researchers by directing them to focus on more 
promising avenues of explanation, and this strategic re-di-
rection should result in a progression in the proportion of 
variation they can explain. Furthermore, do theoreticians 
continually update their calculus, that is, the recommended 
measures and designs? To what extent have media effects 
theoreticians been interested in examining the epistemo-
logical assumptions that underlie their theories? Are the 
theoreticians aware of these assumptions, and if so, are they 
willing to use what they learn from the literature to acknowl-
edge when an assumption has been found to be faulty? And 
ultimately, are theoreticians willing to alter their theory to 
direct researchers away from initial parts of theory that were 
supported by assumptions found to be faulty and re-orient 
those researchers towards other parts of theory that have a 
stronger foundation? 
Theoreticians who regard their theories as fixed and 
spend their careers defending their initial conceptualizations 
can be admired for their initial creativity and continued te-
nacity if the empirical literature of tests substantially support 
those initial claims. However, rarely is a literature so uni-
formly supportive; instead, empirical literatures typically 
display equivocal and contradictory findings that stimulate 
the need for constant re-examination in order to ferret out 
weaker conceptualizations and operationalizations in favor 
of stronger ones that can progressively increase the theory’s 
explanatory value. Scholars who regard their theories as a 
tentative step in a progression towards more insightful and 
powerful explanations will make more valuable contribu-
tions to their fields. And theoreticians who view their role 
as less of an fixed authority and more as a guide to researchers 
that falsifies a proposition in a theory offers a more useful 
finding than does a test that supports a proposition, because 
weak findings allow theoreticians to carve away the parts of 
their systems of explanation that have been found not to work 
and instead concentrate more on those parts that offer great-
er potential for explanation. Thus over time, theories can 
offer a greater degree of guidance that maps out where the 
more promising avenues of research are and thereby directs 
researchers to design studies with more potential to explain 
much higher proportions of variance. This opportunity is 
especially  underutilized in media effects research where so 
many studies fail to explain more than a tiny proportion of 
variance.
B. Theory Recommendations
In the above section, we recommended the use of theory 
as a foundation for empirical tests of media effects, but that 
recommendation has little utility if there are no theories or 
if the existing theories provide researchers with little guid-
ance. We know the first is not the case, that is, there are 
hundreds of media effects theories available, but there may 
be a serious question about the second -- that the existing 
theories are useful as guides in designing empirical tests. 
Given the persistently small proportion of the media effects 
literature that is guided by a theory, it appears that most 
research designers do not believe that the available theories 
are useful. 
We need a rigorous analysis of the existing theories of 
media effects in order to determine if this low use of theory 
is due to a misperception by study designers or whether the 
theories themselves are indeed weak in their ability to guide 
research. Therefore we recommend that active researchers 
be interviewed to find out what their beliefs are about the 
usefulness of theories. We also recommend that the existing 
theories be critically analyzed to determine their potential 
usefulness by engaging in the challenge to answer questions 
in two areas. 
The first area includes questions about the current value 
of media effects theories as guides that are keyed to clarity 
and completeness. Do the available theories provide clear 
enough definitions of their concepts so that researchers can 
easily operationalize measures and research procedures? Do 
theories provide a set of propositions that form a system of 
explanation or do the propositions instead appear as single 
isolated ideas or as a random list with gaps? 
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faulty or to be based on beliefs that have long since lost their 
usefulness. Given the size of the literature on media effects, 
the marginal utility of designing another study that is lim-
ited to suggesting another media effect that has not already 
been suggested has dwindled to a trivial point. 
In contrast, progress down the explanatory path entails 
higher costs but it also offers much higher benefits in terms 
of generating useful knowledge in under-addressed or non-
addressed areas as indicated by the following questions. 
Which of the suggested media effects are the strongest, the 
most prevalent (i.e., occur most often), and have the greatest 
scope (i.e., likely to effect the greatest number of people)? 
How can all these suggested effects be organized in a mean-
ingful way so that we do not call the same thing by different 
names or use the same name for very different kinds of ef-
fects? Which of these effects work together in terms of exist-
ing simultaneously or in an unfolding progression over time? 
Which factors of influence are the strongest (most influential) 
and the most prevalent (leading to many different kinds of 
effects)? What is the nature of the relationships among these 
factors (simple relationships, non-linear, asymmetric, thresh-
olds, ceilings, etc.)? And how do these factors work together 
in bring about media effects (straight line, recursive, indirect, 
etc.)? 
The field of media effects will continue to grow in terms 
of attracting scholars and generating a greater number of 
studies, but in order for the field to also grow in terms of 
increasing useful knowledge about the nature of media ef-
fects, then scholars will have to evolve in their thinking about 
the nature of the field and in their practices in designing 
research studies. Such an evolution begins with individual 
scholars examining the beliefs they take for granted, identi-
fying which are faulty, then displaying the courage to reject 
those beliefs that have been found to be faulty. In his book 
Basic dilemmas in the social sciences, Blalock (1984) says “the 
more information that is missing, the more untested assump-
tions we have to make in order to compensate.” He continues, 
“whenever one is in doubt about an assumption, the tempta-
tion is to hide it from view possibly by using vague language 
or simply playing it down by embedding it in a number of 
innocuous assumptions or a technical discussion that most 
readers are unlikely to follow” (p. 135). The findings of the 
current study show that many of the assumptions that had 
value in allowing us to make progress in an initial explor-
atory phase of building the field of media effects have lost 
their value and now form barriers that slow continued 
will make more useful contributions to other scholars who 
struggle to design better empirical tests that will produce 
more valuable results to the field. This kind of theoretician 
is needed for our field to evolve out of an initial exploratory 
phase. 
C. Paradigm Recommendations
Our most fundamental recommendation is that scholars 
in the field of media effects continue moving from an explor-
atory perspective into a more explanatory perspective. This 
is most fundamental, because until this movement reaches 
a critical point, exploratory studies will continue as the 
dominant form of research, and the field will continue to 
labor under a low ceiling because the exploratory perspective 
provides an easy justification for researchers to select weak-
er design options. 
 The exploratory phase is an essential first step in the 
development of a scholarly field. When a scholarly field is 
new, researchers have little guidance from the literature to 
help them figure out how to assess their focal phenomenon. 
Researchers are limited to designing exploratory studies to 
start building an inventory of rudimentary ideas. They must 
focus on identifying what is possible, so almost every study 
regardless of topic examined, methods used, or strength of 
findings is likely to make a contribution. When designing 
these initial exploratory studies, researchers must rely on 
many untested assumptions as support for their decisions. 
Over time as a research field grows in size and as knowledge 
accumulates, many of those assumptions are found to be 
faulty. Recognizing a faulty assumption forces researchers 
into a dilemma as they are confronted with the decision of 
(a) staying on the same familiar path with its diminishing 
ability to generate findings that would increase knowledge 
about the field’s focal phenomenon or (b) taking the risk of 
making substantial changes in one’s thinking and practices 
for the opportunity to generate much more meaningful 
knowledge. Kuhn (1970) has referred to this dilemma as the 
essential tension in the development of any scholarly field. 
Scholars are confronted with a choice between two paths 
forward essentially must choose between comfort of effi-
ciency and the challenge of becoming more effective.
With media effects research, the efficient path is a con-
tinuation of exploratory studies where it is much easier to 
remain using familiar options even though the assumptions 
used to support those options have been found to be either 
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of these patterns should be relatively easy to change, but 
others will require greater costs. However, more important 
than costs are the benefits. When we focus more on the pur-
pose of our field, the more we will be concerned with elimi-
nating weaker elements in the design of our individual 
studies so that we can achieve greater satisfaction in our 
contributions.
progress.
When we reject the assumptions we relied on in the ex-
ploratory phase of research, we can orient more toward 
greater precision in measurement and design, which will 
reduce the opportunities for error to enter our data. By reduc-
ing measurement error and increasing our understanding of 
the nature of relationships and differences, we can system-
atically improve our ability to explain media effects. Some 
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